Definition of Spirit: A Preface
Some deny the existence of the Angels & demons—(relatively) incoporeal beings, I mean. I should lay out exactly what I mean by both before moving onto the argument from observation for the existence of each. First, as said, spirits are incoporeal beings, as being itself is first divided into coporeal & incoporeal. Then the following difference between spirits is not of species, but of quality. A demon is by definition an unclean spirit, i.e. a spirit which wills away from the Good. And an angel, a clean spirit, willing towards the Good. Of course, it needs be said against some ignorant people, no spirit comes into being evil, for being itself is good as from the Good, but by their evil-will as they’re coming into being fall out of being into ill-being. This occurs as they come into being because they are incoporeal, whereas for men, by account of his coporeality, he falls into ill-being or is raised into well-being throughout the course of his life. Likewise, the Angels enter well-being as they come into being. As for the ranks of Angels, the processions, hierarchy, orders, &c., it is not needful here to lay all these out, and, for demons, it is utterly unapplicable anyways since their horde is anarchic.
Universal Order and the Mind
Having laid out, in brief, a definition of spirit, and in what sense those clean are different from those unclean—again, against some, it is in quality not species—let us move onto a definition of mind, thought, reason, imagination, what they are, what, if anything, the differences, &c. Mind is the faculty of mental perception, for if mind & thus mental thought were not perception (theō̂) then the only true Mind could not be called God (theós). Even an atheist totally ignorant of the Good calls the universe the world (cósmos), some even explicitly using the Greek term. How could the world be set in order (cosmī̂n) & be a habitation (œcuménē) if it hadn’t a Lawmaker (œconómos)? Further, how could a habitation (œcuménē) have a lawmaker (œconómos) if the lawmaker weren’t a mind (nûs)? He wouldn’t be able to divide (némō) or know (noéō) his law (nómos). So the Lawmaker of the world must be a Mind. At any rate, the atheist doesn’t shy away from speaking of the laws of identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, among others, yet shies aways from acknowledging that laws must have a lawmaker? So an atheist cannot deny there is such, even if, again, he is ignorant of It, or supposes It is nothing more than a abstraction (although how an abstraction lacking agency will enforce laws I don’t know how they would explain).
But, returning to, of what nature are the universal laws? For the Cause of the world must, by necessity as cause, be beyond the world—for it is impossible for the cause of something to be limited by that which it caused. But the limitations of the world must, again by necessity, be in the world they limit to limitate it. As anyone learned in logic knows, an operation shares in the nature it is predicated of, thus if the Cause of the world is immaterial (since matter is proper only to composite beings), then Its operations, i.e. laws, must likewise be immaterial, which they are. Who has seen with their eyes the law of identity? Yet it’s universally enforced. Now, returning to mental perception, clearly the principles of such laws are held by the Cause of the world as mental objects (theōría) & thought (nóēma), which is why the only Good is called the only true Mind (nûs) & God (theós), even if some worship lesser so-called gods, as obviously lesser things are also called good &c. And, I should say, perception can not in any other way be predicated of the Good since it cannot, as said, be a body to have bodily organs & senses, and must be able to, in Itself, contemplate the principles subsisting before the world. As composition arises from a being having multiple causes for its constituent parts, the Good before being cannot be compounded, as It has no cause to begin with, at any rate pre-existing simplicity itself, and being beyond the undividedness known of It.
Reason and Man
Returning then to the aim of the discourse, it is apparant there are objects in the world which are immaterial, the forms of which cannot be grapsed by bodily senses. How, then, are they known to us? For no one, I think, is ignorant of the aforementioned laws of logic, nor the monad, dyad, triad, &c., nor genera (even if some seem so), nor the qualities of truth & beauty. If men were ignorant of these, we could be no means have ever mentioned the Good, nor any of the orders of things It brought into existence, and man would in no way be different than an animal, since if genera were inaccesible to him nothing beyond the species of man could be communicated by speech. How could man have as his definitional difference “rational” (logicós) if he were incapable of really meaningful speech (légō)? Further, nature would seem faulty for giving him hands—opposable thumbs, I mean, since some confuse the seeming hands of animals with true hands—unlike every other creature, since he wouldn’t have the reason (logós) to count (légō) with them. Now, again, an atheist agrees the world is reasonable, and that everything exists for a reason (even if they often seem to propose unreasonable causes of things) so that it’d be impossible for man to be misgiven hands, or oversized lungs, or an erect form, &c., unless they want to imagine some opposite principle to the Good, I mean give the evil actual existence, but they’d then have to explain how two opposite principles of existence, one evil & one good, without any sort of bridge could be mutually known, for either the beings of good would be totally ignorant of the evil, or those of evil ignorant of the Good. Further, such misordering of the world would mean the Good is imperfect, but imperfection can only be predicated of particular beings which by reason of their participation in being can fail, since failure is nothing else than unbecoming, i.e. “de-being.” As failure in being, i.e. imperfection, implies a perfection as end of that specific being, the Cause of being cannot be said to be imperfect since It is not made to exist, and thus there is no will for Its being, as It has for us, and it isbalso impossible for the Good to be limited to a part of that which It causes, being I mean, for It to have a share which decreases (unbecomes) or increases (becomes).
Knowledge and Thought
So it’s be sufficiently proven men do have access to knowledge (gnō̂sis). It’d be another discussion over where if anywhere he has a bodily organ for this faculty, its place in the psyche, its relation to the senses, &c. What’s the current matter is so far we’ve only explained that man can understand (diánœa) things in the world via an immaterial mental faculty, and can thus come to know (ginṓscō) goodness, truth, arithmetic, genera & species, the self, &c., & conceptualize (epinœ́ō) from sensory beings—i.e. to distinguish heat from a flame, solditiy from a stone, life from a plant, &c. And we all have done this. But what of “intrusive” thoughts (logísmoi) & inspiration? Even though contemplation is in some sense passive (and this is where the only true Mind is disimilar to our minds), one must actively contemplate something to hold it with his mind. A hand does not passively hold something, unless it itself is held in place. Now as man deliberates (enthyméomæ), because he has a mind to contemplate (theáomæ), his mind would be totally superflous if he didn’t have agency over it. If that were the case, we return to the argument over the consequences of ascribing faultiness to nature, which only those unknowledgable of it ever do. So, then, whence are the thoughts which come to man? There must be another nature, mental, which can immaterially communicate with man’s mind, and even infuse itself with it. Now one would be inclined, and not wrongly I think, to first consider the Good Itself, but, frankly speaking, few of us if any will be purified enough for such union with It. Returning now to what was laid out at the beginning, such a nature is the exact definition of a spirit—and this is why the Good is called a Spirit, and why all the gentile theogonies begin with chaos, which means mouth. None of the ancients will disagree with us, as this is how the Assyrian kings claimed divine status—the national god would infuse with his mind before he laid with a temple prostitute, therby making his son 1/3 divine and 2/3 human—as well as how the Hellenes were inspired by the muses &c. Now, of course, all of these spirits of the gentiles are demons, and by their own admission lead to madness, such as Bacchus’. But, more importantly, what of good thoughts that come to us? They are clearly from the Angels. It should be no surprise that the same Good Which placed angels over each star in the firmament, each planet, each land & its countries, each nation, each tribe, & each family, should likewise place one over each man. And it is the demons' impersonations of these which gentiles then worship & give the honor belonging to the Good. Concerning this, I think their etymology of god (theós) as meaning to run (théō) is fitting, since the demons flee (tréchō) from the Good. Thus all men have experienced the activity of spirits, some consenting to evil thoughts from demons, and thus having a demonically infused mind, and others to good thoughts from the Angels, and thus having a brilliant mind.
Addendum
A further note on the last point about god meaning to run: It’s also fitting Anaxagoras says the Mind set the planets in motion, since Plato gives the aforementioned etymology from the planets’ running. And no one is unaware of how they dedicated the planets to certain ones of their gods.